Trade Policy Opinions at the State Level

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Abstract

Despite economists' nearly universal support for free trade policies, the general public has serious reservations about free trade. To understand this opposition, one must understand the preferences of individuals as they relate to the policy choices of policymakers. Ideally, one would like to know how these preferences differ across regions because legislators who represent their constituents in the U.S. Congress cast the actual votes on trade policies. The present study produces estimates by state of trade preferences linked directly to individual preferences.

Scheve and Slaughter (2001a) found that the lower the skill level of a worker, the stronger the support for additional trade restrictions. I generate estimates by state for 1992 and 1996 using Scheve and Slaughter's estimates. The estimates are generated in two steps. First, an average level of educational attainment for each state is constructed. Second, this educational attainment variable is inserted into Scheve and Slaughter's estimate of the relationship between educational attainment and an individual's support for additional trade restrictions to produce an average probability of state support for additional trade restrictions.

Generally speaking, states in the South have the highest levels of support for additional trade restrictions. Support for additional trade restrictions is lower in 1996 than in 1992. A verdict on the usefulness of these estimates has yet to be delivered; however, in the context of voting on NAFTA by U.S. Senators the estimates for 1992 yield plausible results.

KEYWORDS: trade policy, regional opinions, voting models

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INTRODUCTION

Despite economists' nearly universal support for free trade policies, the general public has serious reservations about free trade. To understand the opposition to free trade, one must understand the preferences of individuals as they relate to the policy choices available to policymakers. A recent study by Scheve and Slaughter (2001a), which focuses on individual preferences, found that the lower the skill level of a worker, the stronger the support for new trade barriers.

Scheve and Slaughter's result is consistent with a Heckscher-Ohlin trade model in which the United States is well endowed with skilled labor. In such a world, according to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, policy changes removing international trade barriers that stimulate inter-industry trade would tend to increase the incomes of skilled labor. Meanwhile, trade liberalization would likely be detrimental to the incomes of unskilled labor.[1] As a result, the incomes of unskilled labor would fall further behind those of skilled labor.[2]

In the context of trade policy determination, one would like to know how these preferences differ across regions because legislators who represent their constituents in the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives cast the actual votes on trade policies. By using Scheve and Slaughter's estimates for individuals, I generate estimates by state for

[1] Factors other than those based on economic self-interest might come into play. See Coughlin (2002) for a discussion of evidence highlighting the potential importance of other considerations.
[2] Since the mid-1970s, Sapir (2000) notes an increasing wage disparity between skilled and unskilled workers in the United States. In addition, between 1973 and 1997 the median real weekly earnings of male, full-time workers declined from $700 to $600 using 1997 dollars.

1992 and 1996.[3] To my knowledge, no one has produced regional estimates of trade preferences linked directly to individual preferences.

To set the stage for my analysis, in the next section I review the aspects of Scheve and Slaughter's analysis that provide the foundation for my estimates. In the subsequent section, I produce estimates of the average probability that a region supports additional trade restrictions. These estimates are examined to see whether the support for additional restrictions by a specific region is associated with the support by its neighbors. I complete this section by generating estimates of the percentage of a region's population likely to support additional trade restrictions. To generate evidence on the usefulness of my estimates, in the final section of the body of this paper I examine voting by U.S. Senators on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). A summary completes the paper.

INDIVIDUAL OPINIONS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE RESTRICTIONS

Rodrik (1995) stressed that an essential element of any political-economy model of trade policy is a description of individual preferences pertaining to the policy options available to policymakers.[4] By describing individual preferences, a recent study by Scheve and Slaughter (2001b) is a major improvement over previous studies that generally use observed political actions to make inferences about trade-policy preferences. Lacking direct information on individual preferences, such inferences are

[3] When data on educational attainment are released as part of the 2000 Census, estimates by congressional district will be generated. The data are scheduled for release during spring 2002.

[4] Rodrik (1995) identified other essential elements. To complete the "demand side" the model must explain how individual preferences are aggregated into political demands for a specific policy. Interest groups play a key role in translating preferences into demands. With respect to the "supply side" the model must characterize the preferences of policymakers and then specify the institutional setting in which policy takes place. In addition, trade policies in one country are generally interdependent with trade policies in other countries.

problematic because policy preferences and institutions jointly determine policy actions. Thus, the mapping from preferences to actions is not unique.

Scheve and Slaughter (2001a) use data from the 1992 and 1996 National Election Studies surveys to examine the determinants of individual preferences about trade policy.[5] The following question was posed in the survey to assess individual preferences:

> "Some people have suggested placing new limits on foreign imports in order to protect American jobs. Others say that such limits would raise consumer prices and hurt American exports. Do you favor or oppose placing new limits on imports, or haven't you thought much about this?"

Responses of those favoring additional trade restrictions were coded as 1, while responses of those opposing additional trade barriers were coded as 0. Based on a sample of 1736 observations in 1992, 67 percent of respondents favored additional trade restrictions and 33 percent opposed them. By 1996 support for additional trade barriers had diminished somewhat. Based on a sample of 846 observations in that year, 53 percent favored additional trade restrictions and 47 percent opposed them.

The National Election Studies surveys also recorded many details about individual respondents. This information allowed Scheve and Slaughter to explore how individual preferences about trade policy were related to educational attainment, occupation, industry of employment, and county of residence. I focus on how educational attainment affects trade-policy preferences. Table 1 shows the results of Scheve and Slaughter's logistic regressions examining the relationship between educational attainment and support for additional trade restrictions using 1992 and 1996

[5] Scheve and Slaughter (2001a) also use the National Election Studies survey to examine immigration policy.

data. The results support the hypothesis that individuals' skill levels determine trade-policy preferences.[6]

Using the estimated equations for 1992 and 1996 to generate expected values for trade-policy preferences yields some interesting results. In 1992 average educational attainment was 13.29 years; this value generates an expected value of 0.68 for the average individual's trade opinion.[7] Thus, the average individual in 1992 had a strong preference for imposing new trade restrictions. In 1996 average educational attainment was 13.87 years, producing an expected trade opinion of 0.54.

Clearly, the average individual was less supportive of additional trade restrictions in 1996 than in 1992. Some of the decline might be due to increased educational attainment; however, such an explanation is, at most, only a partial explanation. If one uses average educational attainment in 1996 in the estimated equation for 1992, the expected trade opinion is 0.65. A standard finding in the trade-policy literature is that macroeconomic conditions affect the demand for protectionist actions.[8] Scheve and Slaughter's results support the view that the state of the macroeconomic economy had an affect on individuals' trade-policy preferences. Few would dispute the assessment that macroeconomic conditions were better in 1996 than in 1992. For example, the average unemployment rate was 7.5 percent during 1992 and 5.4 percent during 1996.

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[6] Regressions using occupation wage, an alternative measure of skill, as the independent variable produced additional support for the importance of skill levels in determining trade-policy preferences.

[7] The expected value of an individual's trade opinion is defined as follows: $E(Trade\ Opinion_I) = Pr(Trade\ Opinion_I = 1|\pi_I) = \pi_I$, where I indexes each observation and π_I equals the probability that an individual supports trade restrictions. Using the logistic distribution, $\pi_I = 1/(1 + \exp(-x_I\beta))$.

[8] See Rodrik (1995), Coughlin et al. (1989), and Bohara and Kaempfer (1991) for additional references and analyses dealing with this issue. For example, Bohara and Kaempfer found that U.S. tariffs were Granger-caused by unemployment, real gross national product, and inflation.

SUPPPORT FOR ADDITIONAL TRADE RESTRICTIONS: STATE ESTIMATES

Producing state estimates is straightforward. An estimate for average educational attainment in each region was generated for 1992 and 1996. This estimate was then used to calculate an average probability using the estimated equations in Table 1.

State Estimates of Educational Attainment

Based on the March supplement of the *Current Population Survey*, I created an average level of education for each state. First, the *Survey's* educational attainment variable was converted to measures of completed education in years. The conversion assumptions are listed in Table 2. Not surprisingly, I think all the assumptions are justified; however, I would like to make a few remarks about some specific assumptions.

Responses of "None," "First-Fourth Grade," "Fifth-Sixth Grade," and "Seventh-Eighth Grade" were all assigned eight years of completed education. A possibility of upward bias exists. In light of the small percentage of responses in the first three of these four categories; however, this assumption does not affect the estimates materially. Responses of "Ninth Grade," "Tenth Grade," and "Eleventh Grade" were assigned 9, 10, and 11 years of completed education. In many cases the students likely dropped out at some point in the following school year, so it is possible that there is some downward bias in the educational attainment measure. Similar to the preceding case, the bias is likely to be quite small. "Some College, but No Degree" was assigned 13 years. In this case the bias could be in either direction. Some students leave before completing successfully their first year of college, while others leave after completing more than one year. Another source of potential bias arises due to the possibility that some individuals have multiple master's degrees or a master's degree and a doctorate in different fields. In

both cases the assignments of 18 and 20 years, respectively, understates the years of completed education; however, the degree of bias is likely to be small because of the small percentage of the population falling into these categories.

Given the preceding assumptions, the focus was restricted to people 25 and older. Then, using the weights of each category based on the *Survey's* results, I calculated a weighted average years of completed education for each state.[9]

State Estimates of Support for Additional Trade Restrictions

Inserting the estimates for educational attainment into the equations listed in Table 1 produces the results for individual states, plus the District of Columbia, listed in Table 3. A ranking of the estimated probabilities from highest (1) to lowest (51) is provided in parentheses. The estimated average probability across states ranges from 0.677 in Colorado to 0.743 in West Virginia. This range of probabilities that an average individual in a state supports additional trade restrictions reflects a range of an average educational attainment of 13.39 years in Colorado to 11.92 years in West Virginia. Thus, average educational attainment in Colorado exceeded the high school diploma level attained in West Virginia by roughly 1.5 years. The District of Columbia, which has the highest average educational attainment in 1992 of 13.51 years, has the lowest average probability of supporting additional trade restrictions, 0.672.

The estimates for 1992 reveal an average opinion across all regions of 0.706, which exceeds the average opinion of 0.671 in the National Election Studies survey. Thus, my estimates tend to show stronger protectionist sentiments than those in Scheve and Slaughter (2001a). The reason is that the average educational attainment of the

[9] These results are available upon request.

respondents in the National Elections Studies surveys exceeds that of the 25 and older population in the United States that was used to produce my estimates. For example, average educational attainment for the survey respondents was 13.29 in 1992, while the simple average across the regions in Table 3 was 12.77. Another way to see the difference is that 92 percent of the survey sample had a high school degree or more in 1992, while in the United States as a whole 79 percent had a high school degree or more.

An alternative presentation of the results for 1992 (Table 3) is contained in Figure 1. The map, based on quartiles, reveals a clustering of protectionist sentiment. In other words, a state with a high degree of protectionist sentiment is likely to be located near other states with high degrees of protectionist sentiment and a state with a low degree is likely to be located near other states with low degrees of protectionist sentiment. One way to measure this spatial autocorrelation is by Moran's I. This statistic, which in most cases ranges from –1 to +1, is 0.5 in 1992. Such a value indicates a high degree of positive spatial autocorrelation.

This clustering of protectionist sentiment reflects the fact that educational attainment tends to be similar for clusters of states. Figure 1 shows that the South tends to have the highest levels of average support for additional trade restrictions. These results are consistent with the existing, albeit scarce, information on trade opinions for specific regions. For example, Sarpolus (2000) found that respondents from Southern states were less likely to approve of free trade agreements than were respondents from other states.

Turning to the results for 1996 presented in Table 3, one sees that the estimated average probability across states ranges from 0.561 in Colorado to 0.651 in West

Virginia. This range is slightly larger than the range estimated for 1992. Identical to 1992, the District of Columbia has the lowest average probability of supporting additional trade restrictions, 0.555.

The average probabilities of support in 1996 for additional trade restrictions are lower than in 1992. For example, the average of the 51 regions is 0.600 in 1996, a decline from 0.706 in 1992. As discussed previously, the better macroeconomic conditions in 1996 relative to 1992 likely account for some of the decline in support for additional trade restrictions. In addition, average educational attainment tended to rise. For example, in Colorado average educational attainment rose to 13.56 years in 1996 from 13.39 years in 1992. Similarly, in West Virginia average educational attainment rose to 12.20 years from 11.92 years.

Figure 2 shows the results for 1996 presented in Table 2. Similar to 1992, the map reveals a clustering of protectionist sentiment. The clustering in 1996, however, is not as pronounced as in 1992. Moran's I for 1996 is 0.4, down from 0.5 in 1992. Southern portions of the United States continue to have the highest levels of average support for additional trade restrictions.

Another way to use the regression results of Scheve and Slaughter (2001a) is to calculate the educational attainment level that would produce a probability of 0.5 for supporting additional trade restrictions.[10] These levels are 16.8 years of education for 1992 and 14.4 years for 1996. Next, calculate the percentage of a region's population that produces a probability of 0.5 or higher. Obviously, the rest of a region's population can be viewed as opposing additional trade restrictions. These percentages are presented

[10] A probability of 0.5 can be viewed as the point dividing supporters of additional trade restrictions from opponents.

in Table 4. All states in 1992 have support percentages of 89 percent or more. The District of Columbia is somewhat of an outlier with a support percentage of *only* 81 percent. The average of all regions is 93 percent. By 1996, the support percentages, while still large in absolute terms, had declined substantially. No state had a support percentage exceeding 86 percent and 17 regions, with the District of Columbia leading with 34 percent, had opposition percentages exceeding 25 percent.

STATE TRADE POLICY OPINIONS AND VOTING ON NAFTA

A reasonable question is whether the preceding estimates contribute to knowledge about voting on trade policy. To generate evidence on the usefulness of the estimates reported in Table 3, I examine voting by U.S. Senators on NAFTA. Numerous voting models have been proposed and estimated.[11] Generally speaking, these studies estimate a single equation that relies on either logit or probit specifications.

Numerous variables have been used in these voting model studies. One category of variables attempts to control for the fact that certain industries and factors of production were expected to benefit from the passage of NAFTA, while other industries and factors were expected to suffer. The economic interests of constituents have been found to affect the voting behavior of their representatives in most voting model studies. A second category of variables attempts to control for the ideology of the representative. The ideology of a representative is likely to reflect those of his/her constituents. A third category of variables attempts to control for the political party of the representative. The Democratic and Republican parties have had opposing views on trade issues for many years. A final category of variables attempts to control for campaign contributions by

organized interest groups. Contributions by political action committees (PACs) are likely to affect, as well as be affected by, the voting behavior of senators.

In the present illustration, I rely on a model by Baldwin and Magee (2000).[12] In their model, a senator's vote on NAFTA is expected to be influenced by economic interests, ideology, and campaign contributions. One of their innovations involves the treatment of campaign contributions. Campaign contributions are likely to affect a senator's vote on NAFTA. In addition, a senator's expected vote on NAFTA may have affected the amount of contributions the senator received. Because of this bi-directional relationship between campaign contributions and voting, Baldwin and Magee estimate separate equations for contributions from business and labor PACs to avoid biased estimates of the impacts of these contributions on senators' votes.

Baldwin and Magee's estimates of the determinants of U.S. Senate voting on NAFTA are reported in variant 1 in Table 5.[13] Generally speaking, labor interests opposed NAFTA because of concerns that NAFTA would have adverse effects on the jobs and earnings of labor, especially those with low skills. On the other hand, business interests supported NAFTA because of the opportunities associated with larger markets and the potential reductions in costs due to gains in efficiency.

The results show that ideology was not a statistically significant determinant of voting by senators on NAFTA. The results for two proxies are reported. *AFL-CIO*, an ideological rating by the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations is expected to be related negatively to votes in favor of NAFTA.

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[11] Examples include Baldwin and Magee (2000), Kang and Greene (1999), Kamdar and Gonzalez (1998), Thorbecke (1997), Conybeare and Zinkula (1996), and Kahane (1996).

[12] Special thanks are due Christopher Magee for providing data and programs.

[13] The estimates of the contributions equations are omitted. See Baldwin and Magee (2000, Table 6).

Chamber of Commerce, an ideological rating by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, is expected to be related positively to votes in favor of NAFTA. Neither proxy is statistically significant.

In contrast to ideology, both measures of contributions from PACs are statistically significant and possess the hypothesized relationships with senators' votes. *Labor contributions*, which are PAC contributions from organized labor interests, are related negatively to votes in favor of NAFTA. *Business contributions*, which are PAC contributions from organized business interests, are related positively to votes in favor of NAFTA.

Measures for the economic interests of the senators' constituents generally performed as expected. *Union*, which is the private-sector unionization rate by state, is a statistically significant determinant. As expected, it is related negatively to votes in favor of NAFTA. *Export ratio*, which is the ratio of state employment in industries in which the United States is a net exporter to state employment in industries in which the United States in a net importer, is also a statistically significant determinant. As expected, it is related positively to votes in favor of NAFTA. *No high school degree*, which is the fraction of a state's 25 and older population without a high school diploma, is not a statistically significant determinant. This measure of low skill workers is expected to be related negatively to support for NAFTA; however, the estimates do not reveal this expected relationship. Finally, *Textiles*, which is the share of a state's total employment accounted for by its textiles industry, is a statistically significant determinant. As expected, larger shares of employment in textiles are associated with increased opposition to NAFTA.

In variant 2 I simply append my estimate of state support for additional trade restrictions in 1992, which is listed in Table 3. *Support for restrictions* is a statistically significant determinant. As expected, increased support for restrictions is related negatively to support for NAFTA.

One consequence of simply appending my estimate of state support for additional trade restrictions is that both contribution variables are no longer statistically significant. In variant 3 I report results of a model that eliminates *AFL-CIO*, *No high school degree*, and *Textiles*. In this model the contribution variables are statistically significant. More noteworthy for my purposes is that fact that state support for additional trade restrictions retains its statistical significance.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, voting on trade-policy issues is likely to be related to the individual preferences of the constituents that a legislator represents. To date, however, in voting model studies the preferences of the constituents were inferred based on their economic interests rather than generated directly. Using research by Scheve and Slaughter (2001a) that generates information on individual trade-policy preferences, I produced estimates of trade-policy preferences on a state-by-state basis for 1992 and 1996. These estimates utilized Scheve and Slaughter's finding that lower levels of educational attainment are associated with increased support for additional trade restrictions.

Using an average level of educational attainment for each state, I generated an average probability by state of support for additional trade restrictions. Because average educational attainment in neighboring states is similar throughout the United States, support for additional trade restrictions tends to cluster. Generally speaking, states in the

South have the highest levels of support for additional trade restrictions. Another generalization is that support for additional trade restrictions is lower in 1996 than in 1992. A verdict on the usefulness of these estimates has yet to be delivered; however, in the context of voting on NAFTA by U.S. Senators the estimates for 1992 yield plausible results.

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Table 1

Logit Estimates of Individual Opinions on International Trade Restrictions*

	1992	1996
Constant	3.648 (0.350)	4.031 (0.519)
Education Years	-0.217 (0.025)	-0.279 (0.036)

*These coefficient estimates and the associated standard errors (in parentheses) were generated by Scheve and Slaughter (2001a). See Table 3.3, Model 2; and Table 3.4, Model 2. The dependent variable is based on individual responses to a question about U.S. trade policy. This variable is defined such that 1 indicates an opinion favoring trade restrictions and 0 indicates opposition.

Table 2

Assumptions Underlying Calculation of Educational Attainment

Educational Attainment	Assigned Years of Completed Education
None	8
First-Fourth Grade	8
Fifth-Sixth Grade	8
Seventh-Eighth Grade	8
Ninth Grade	9
Tenth Grade	10
Eleventh Grade	11
High School Graduate	12
Some College, No Degree	13
Associate Degree	14
Bachelor's Degree	16
Master's Degree	18
Professional Degree	20
Doctorate Degree	20

Table 3 -- Average Probability of Supporting Additional Trade Restrictions		
	Probability Using Average Educational Attainment (Rank)	
State	1992	1996
Alabama	0.731 (5)	0.636 (5)
Alaska	0.682 (48)	0.567 (48)
Arizona	0.692 (41)	0.605 (21)
Arkansas	0.728 (6)	0.643 (3)
California	0.699 (36)	0.596 (28)
Colorado	0.677 (50)	0.561 (50)
Connecticut	0.685 (47)	0.567 (47)
Delaware	0.706 (27)	0.587 (37)
District of Columbia	0.672 (51)	0.555 (51)
Florida	0.705 (28)	0.609 (18)
Georgia	0.718 (11)	0.616 (14)
Hawaii	0.688 (42)	0.603 (24)
Idaho	0.710 (22)	0.599 (26)
Illinois	0.703 (29)	0.594 (31)
Indiana	0.724 (9)	0.618 (12)
Iowa	0.717 (12)	0.595 (29)
Kansas	0.685 (45)	0.583 (40)
Kentucky	0.740 (2)	0.644 (2)
Louisiana	0.726 (8)	0.636 (4)
Maine	0.710 (21)	0.610 (16)
Maryland	0.696 (38)	0.565 (49)
Massachusetts	0.685 (46)	0.568 (46)
Michigan	0.710 (20)	0.601 (25)
Minnesota	0.702 (30)	0.576 (43)
Mississippi	0.736 (4)	0.633 (6)
Missouri	0.713 (15)	0.599 (27)
Montana	0.706 (26)	0.594 (30)
Nebraska	0.700 (34)	0.589 (35)
Nevada	0.702 (31)	0.604 (22)
New Hampshire	0.687 (43)	0.580 (42)
New Jersey	0.692 (40)	0.586 (38)
New Mexico	0.702 (32)	0.622 (10)
New York	0.701 (33)	0.593 (32)
North Carolina	0.722 (10)	0.623 (8)
North Dakota	0.708 (23)	0.618 (13)
Ohio	0.712 (16)	0.603 (23)
Oklahoma	0.707 (24)	0.606 (19)
Oregon	0.696 (39)	0.590 (34)
Pennsylvania	0.714 (13)	0.609 (17)
Rhode Island	0.710 (19)	0.606 (20)
South Carolina	0.726 (7)	0.631 (7)
South Dakota	0.711 (18)	0.612 (15)
Tennessee	0.738 (3)	0.618 (11)
Texas	0.713 (14)	0.623 (9)
Utah	0.686 (44)	0.568 (45)
Vermont	0.700 (35)	0.583 (39)
Virginia	0.706 (25)	0.592 (33)
Washington	0.681 (49)	0.569 (44)
West Virginia	0.743 (1)	0.652 (1)
Wisconsin	0.711 (17)	0.588 (36)
Wyoming	0.699 (37)	0.581 (41)
Average of regions	0.706	0.600

Table 4 -- Percentage Supporting/Opposing Additional Trade Restrictions				
State	1992		1996	
	Support	Opposition	Support	Opposition
Alabama	95	5	82	18
Alaska	92	8	73	27
Arizona	91	9	80	20
Arkansas	95	5	85	15
California	92	8	73	27
Colorado	91	9	70	30
Connecticut	91	9	68	32
Delaware	93	7	73	27
District of Columbia	81	19	66	34
Florida	93	7	80	20
Georgia	94	6	78	22
Hawaii	93	7	76	24
Idaho	95	5	80	20
Illinois	92	8	76	24
Indiana	95	5	84	16
Iowa	95	5	79	21
Kansas	91	9	74	26
Kentucky	93	7	82	18
Louisiana	95	5	81	19
Maine	93	7	80	20
Maryland	90	10	68	32
Massachusetts	89	11	68	32
Michigan	93	7	79	21
Minnesota	95	5	74	26
Mississippi	97	3	83	17
Missouri	94	6	76	24
Montana	94	6	78	22
Nebraska	95	5	76	24
Nevada	94	6	81	19
New Hampshire	89	11	72	28
New Jersey	91	9	72	28
New Mexico	92	8	79	21
New York	90	10	74	26
North Carolina	95	5	79	21
North Dakota	94	6	80	20
Ohio	94	6	78	22
Oklahoma	94	6	80	20
Oregon	94	6	77	23
Pennsylvania	93	7	78	22
Rhode Island	91	9	76	24
South Carolina	95	5	82	18
South Dakota	95	5	79	21
Tennessee	95	5	81	19
Texas	93	7	78	22
Utah	93	7	74	26
Vermont	92	8	73	27
Virginia	91	9	74	26
Washington	92	8	74	26
West Virginia	95	5	86	14
Wisconsin	94	6	76	24
Wyoming	94	6	76	24
Average of regions	93	7	77	23

Table 5
U.S. Senate Voting on NAFTA

Variable	Variant 1 Coefficient (standard error)	Variant 2 Coefficient (standard error)	Variant 3 Coefficient (standard error)
Constant	0.695 (1.878)	27.046* (15.366)	12.262* (7.146)
AFL-CIO	0.002 (0.012)	-0.017 (0.015)	
Chamber of Commerce	-0.015 (0.017)	-0.011 (0.017)	-0.018 (0.013)
Labor contributions	-0.008** (0.004)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.007* (0.003)
Business contributions	0.002** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)
Union	-0.169*** (0.062)	-0.108** (0.044)	-0.106** (0.044)
Export ratio	1.808** (0.767)	1.053* (0.554)	1.405** (0.674)
No high school degree	0.145 (3.584)	10.070 (6.443)	
Textiles	-46.446** (20.741)	-37.030* (19.190)	
Support for restrictions		-39.965* (22.193)	-17.134* (9.904)

* Statistically different from zero at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level.
Source: Variant 1: Baldwin and Magee (2000); Variants 2 and 3: author's calculations.

Figure 1: Probability of Supporting Additional Trade Restrictions

1992



Figure 2: Probability of Supporting Additional Trade Restrictions

1996